Ethics of Convenience
There is some appeal to the notion that morality, our ideas of right and wrong, depends on the person talking. After all, it's not uncommon to hear people saying, "it's wrong for you but not for me," implying that the nature of right and wrong depends on the caprice of any individual, and so we cannot impose our own moral opinions to others. We want to debate the truthfulness of this proposition but it seems that it's not easy how we should proceed. Moral issues are unlike factual issues which can be resolved through simply knowing the right facts. Even if we come to acquire the facts that surround a particular moral issue, it seems that the problem does not dissipate. And so, it leads some people to conclude that there really is no objective moral fact that we can all know or discern but it depends solely on the individual. The moral subjectivist, the one holding this kind of belief, may as well say that morality is in the eye of the beholder.
Moral subjectivism has some force but its power trickle down once it is scrutinized in detail. We may not be able to provide some concrete evidence to the falsity of moral subjectivism; after all, it's unlike a dispute over facts. There seems to be no way we can look into the world and find some physical evidence against it. However, we can find that there is something wrong with it when we examine its implications. First of all, if morality is ultimately decided by the individual, then laws would have no value. On the contrary, imposing them would be against the right of the individuals who commit crimes but thought that it's ok for them to do so. But we all know believe in the necessity of laws. They make our lives easier, more convenient, and most importantly, safer. If there are no laws, there would certainly be chaos and disorder that will ultimately result in the disintegration of societies. We cannot completely do away without some laws because even though laws may incur some inconvenience they nevertheless provide us more benefits that we can imagine. Moral subjectivism also undermines the value of genuine ethical dialogue. We debate and discuss the morality of many ethical issues like the imposition of death penalty or euthanasia or the legalization of contraceptives because we believe that there is some way in which all of us can agree about these matters, even though we have lots of differences. But if moral subjectivism is true, then there is no point to talk and deliberate about these matters because there is no ultimate objective truth regarding morality that we may discover. We can still have moral discourse but it would seem that whatever side wins, wins not so much because it corresponds to an objective truth but because its adherents have the power or influence or the rhetoric to impose it.
This is why for some stubborn people who want to stick to moral subjectivism as a viable philosophy in life only do so because it provides them with convenience. This is also the reason why moral subjectivism can also be called an ethics of convenience. When somebody points out that what they are doing is wrong, it is easy to say, "It is wrong for you but not for me," and that would be the end of the matter. It seems that such an answer is available for anyone who wants to make a justifiable excuse for what they really know is wrong. And it is interesting to know what happens when they are the ones on the opposite end of the line. For some intellectuals, moral relativism seems defensible intellectually and personally and they go to great lengths to argue for it. They may have some points worth discussing about but it seems that carried to its extreme, moral subjectivism is practically unlivable. No one can live in a world where stealing is ok or rape or wanton cruelty or random killing just for the fun of it. Even moral subjectivists rely on the effectiveness and implementation of laws when carrying out their lives. Everyone of us need some forms of universal justice to trust our fellow human beings and to perform our duties. If we believe in moral subjectivism, justice should not make sense to us and we don't have to do our duties. Moral subjectivism clearly destroys such important universal values as justice and love and even the stubborn moral subjectivism would have to concede that those values are important and necessary not only for the survival but also for the flourishing of all human beings (which clearly include them).
And so, the moral subjectivistwho is fast in saying, "it's wrong for you but not for me" betrays a kind of inconsistency in his value system. This same person relies that other people would treat him justly in his dealings with him. He also depends on the laws of his society and on other people to follow these laws so that everybody, including himself, would be able to function well in the society they are in. His very life depends on the universality of these laws; otherwise, there would be no decent society in the first place because it depends on some laws on which everybody can agree.As such, he may likely have said this simply to make an excuse for his action and he doesn't want anyone interfere with it. But morality overrides certain inconveniences. In fact, our moral duties and obligations sometimes even imply pain on our part. But we should bear in mind that right is right and wrong is wrong, and it doesn't change whatever one says about them. Morality is indeed something objective. It may not be proven as scientific hypothesis have been, but it's clear that we can never discard it, like the gadfly of Wittgenstein, for as long as we live.
Moral subjectivism has some force but its power trickle down once it is scrutinized in detail. We may not be able to provide some concrete evidence to the falsity of moral subjectivism; after all, it's unlike a dispute over facts. There seems to be no way we can look into the world and find some physical evidence against it. However, we can find that there is something wrong with it when we examine its implications. First of all, if morality is ultimately decided by the individual, then laws would have no value. On the contrary, imposing them would be against the right of the individuals who commit crimes but thought that it's ok for them to do so. But we all know believe in the necessity of laws. They make our lives easier, more convenient, and most importantly, safer. If there are no laws, there would certainly be chaos and disorder that will ultimately result in the disintegration of societies. We cannot completely do away without some laws because even though laws may incur some inconvenience they nevertheless provide us more benefits that we can imagine. Moral subjectivism also undermines the value of genuine ethical dialogue. We debate and discuss the morality of many ethical issues like the imposition of death penalty or euthanasia or the legalization of contraceptives because we believe that there is some way in which all of us can agree about these matters, even though we have lots of differences. But if moral subjectivism is true, then there is no point to talk and deliberate about these matters because there is no ultimate objective truth regarding morality that we may discover. We can still have moral discourse but it would seem that whatever side wins, wins not so much because it corresponds to an objective truth but because its adherents have the power or influence or the rhetoric to impose it.
This is why for some stubborn people who want to stick to moral subjectivism as a viable philosophy in life only do so because it provides them with convenience. This is also the reason why moral subjectivism can also be called an ethics of convenience. When somebody points out that what they are doing is wrong, it is easy to say, "It is wrong for you but not for me," and that would be the end of the matter. It seems that such an answer is available for anyone who wants to make a justifiable excuse for what they really know is wrong. And it is interesting to know what happens when they are the ones on the opposite end of the line. For some intellectuals, moral relativism seems defensible intellectually and personally and they go to great lengths to argue for it. They may have some points worth discussing about but it seems that carried to its extreme, moral subjectivism is practically unlivable. No one can live in a world where stealing is ok or rape or wanton cruelty or random killing just for the fun of it. Even moral subjectivists rely on the effectiveness and implementation of laws when carrying out their lives. Everyone of us need some forms of universal justice to trust our fellow human beings and to perform our duties. If we believe in moral subjectivism, justice should not make sense to us and we don't have to do our duties. Moral subjectivism clearly destroys such important universal values as justice and love and even the stubborn moral subjectivism would have to concede that those values are important and necessary not only for the survival but also for the flourishing of all human beings (which clearly include them).
And so, the moral subjectivistwho is fast in saying, "it's wrong for you but not for me" betrays a kind of inconsistency in his value system. This same person relies that other people would treat him justly in his dealings with him. He also depends on the laws of his society and on other people to follow these laws so that everybody, including himself, would be able to function well in the society they are in. His very life depends on the universality of these laws; otherwise, there would be no decent society in the first place because it depends on some laws on which everybody can agree.As such, he may likely have said this simply to make an excuse for his action and he doesn't want anyone interfere with it. But morality overrides certain inconveniences. In fact, our moral duties and obligations sometimes even imply pain on our part. But we should bear in mind that right is right and wrong is wrong, and it doesn't change whatever one says about them. Morality is indeed something objective. It may not be proven as scientific hypothesis have been, but it's clear that we can never discard it, like the gadfly of Wittgenstein, for as long as we live.