State Intervention on Humanitarian Areas
The limited but growing recognition of the possibility of intervention on humanitarian grounds is the first crack in the arguments used to support the principle of no intervention.
In addition, as more and more nations formally embrace democratic ideals, the first two factors listed above are losing much of their force.
As most countries want to trade with the outside world, the third factor becomes a two-edged sword would-be intervenient may be less dependent on bilateral trade than the states which are the targets of intervention.
The problems referred to in the fourth factor are not as insurmountable as they might once have seemed (as evidenced by, for example, the fact that the African National Congress (ANC) was seen in many international forums as the legitimate voice of the black majority of South Africa).
The final factor remains an important one and the resolution of this inconsistency depends on the development of constitutional theory and the development of new institutions, the reform of old institutions and/or the increased utilization of existing institutions.
Nonetheless, within 10-20 years, the prior successful use of force will be as contemptible a claim to recognition in international law as it is within the domestic constitutional law of existing democracies.
Within 20 years, it will be impracticable for authoritarian regimes to overthrow democratic regimes because of the consequent denial of recognition and, to a lesser extent, because the intervention of others will 'be unequivocally sanctioned.
During that period, the justification for what we would now call 'intervention' will have been properly worked out as part of the emerging international constitutional jurisprudence.
The full acceptance of this principle means that a government only represents internationally those whose consent it has sought and gained.
This would involve little change for democratic regimes.
For undemocratic regimes it would mean that the government would be seen as representing only those whose consent it has sought, be it a party, an ethnic group or a restricted franchise.
This allows no democratic regimes to be recognized as representing one or more groups within the geographical area of the relevant state with a current capacity to dominate other groups.
However, a government that has not sought a mandate from a group of people would not be seen as speaking for those so excluded.
This leaves obvious lacunae for those whose consent the government has not sought.
It opens the way for others to claim to represent those whose consent has not been sought by the government.
In some cases, such credentials would be easily established.
Where a democratically elected government is ousted in a military coup, members of that government or their accredited representatives still at large would speak for that government.
In most cases, it is not nearly so clear who will have the right to speak for those whose consent the government has not sought.
It is part of the nature of dictatorships and oligarchies that they will use force to prevent and intimidate the processes by which such credentials could be established.
There will usually be a number of voices claiming to speak for the unrepresented in a number of overlapping ways.
Sometimes, there will be a body that represents the bulk of the people in one sphere of life that comes to speak more broadly -such as the Catholic Church in communist Poland and COSATU in South Africa.
This means that the excluded will not speak with a strong, clear and unified voice.
However, that is no reason for not listening to them.
In particular, those who try to suppress those voices have no standing to suggest that the lack of clarity should be held against those voices which can still be heard.
In addition, as more and more nations formally embrace democratic ideals, the first two factors listed above are losing much of their force.
As most countries want to trade with the outside world, the third factor becomes a two-edged sword would-be intervenient may be less dependent on bilateral trade than the states which are the targets of intervention.
The problems referred to in the fourth factor are not as insurmountable as they might once have seemed (as evidenced by, for example, the fact that the African National Congress (ANC) was seen in many international forums as the legitimate voice of the black majority of South Africa).
The final factor remains an important one and the resolution of this inconsistency depends on the development of constitutional theory and the development of new institutions, the reform of old institutions and/or the increased utilization of existing institutions.
Nonetheless, within 10-20 years, the prior successful use of force will be as contemptible a claim to recognition in international law as it is within the domestic constitutional law of existing democracies.
Within 20 years, it will be impracticable for authoritarian regimes to overthrow democratic regimes because of the consequent denial of recognition and, to a lesser extent, because the intervention of others will 'be unequivocally sanctioned.
During that period, the justification for what we would now call 'intervention' will have been properly worked out as part of the emerging international constitutional jurisprudence.
The full acceptance of this principle means that a government only represents internationally those whose consent it has sought and gained.
This would involve little change for democratic regimes.
For undemocratic regimes it would mean that the government would be seen as representing only those whose consent it has sought, be it a party, an ethnic group or a restricted franchise.
This allows no democratic regimes to be recognized as representing one or more groups within the geographical area of the relevant state with a current capacity to dominate other groups.
However, a government that has not sought a mandate from a group of people would not be seen as speaking for those so excluded.
This leaves obvious lacunae for those whose consent the government has not sought.
It opens the way for others to claim to represent those whose consent has not been sought by the government.
In some cases, such credentials would be easily established.
Where a democratically elected government is ousted in a military coup, members of that government or their accredited representatives still at large would speak for that government.
In most cases, it is not nearly so clear who will have the right to speak for those whose consent the government has not sought.
It is part of the nature of dictatorships and oligarchies that they will use force to prevent and intimidate the processes by which such credentials could be established.
There will usually be a number of voices claiming to speak for the unrepresented in a number of overlapping ways.
Sometimes, there will be a body that represents the bulk of the people in one sphere of life that comes to speak more broadly -such as the Catholic Church in communist Poland and COSATU in South Africa.
This means that the excluded will not speak with a strong, clear and unified voice.
However, that is no reason for not listening to them.
In particular, those who try to suppress those voices have no standing to suggest that the lack of clarity should be held against those voices which can still be heard.
