Introduction In order to understand why is was difficult for the British to formulate a strategy that would have averted open rebellion in their thirteen North American Colonies, one must understand the state of the British Empire just prior to the revolution and why Parliament made certain decisions.
In the pages that follow I'll discuss why the British would not have been able to provide an amicable resolution that would maintain the status of their empire and continued domination of the thirteen North American Colonies.
Colonial discontent in North America revolved around two policy issues that the British were unable or unwilling to address.
The first was taxation without representation.
The British had to collect revenue from the colonies in order the help pay for the military and administrative machine that, from Parliament's perspective, benefited the colonies.
The second major policy issue was Parliamentary control.
The British had to find a way to exercise Parliamentary control over the colonies while still giving the colonies a sense of autonomy.
Failure to resolve these issues led to a pattern of legislation and colonial reaction that could only result in open rebellion.
The British Parliament would levy a tax or power over the colonies, the colonies responded with reasonable arguments, and parliament would repeal the act only to follow-up with the passing of another tax or power over the colonies.
Understanding the Political Objective The Acts of the British Parliament concerning its North American Colonies during the years 1763 - 1776 were not arbitrary.
By understanding the role of the British Parliament and the reason's for some of its most memorable Acts, one can gain a better understanding and respect for colonial discontent.
At the time of the American Revolution there were factors that motivated Parliament to pass restrictive legislative Acts in their American Colonies: 1.
Global Exploration was in full stride and European nations such as Britain, Spain, and France were colonizing countless regions of the world.
In many cases, these empires would clash in a struggle for supremacy; 2.
Internal factors such as King George III bouts with madness which led to a growing need for the clear judgment of the prime minister and Parliament's efforts to maintain the social status of the nobility; 3.
External forces such as national debt and a desire for peace with the Indians.
In an age of global expansion of European nations, Britain could not concede to the demands of the American Colonies while maintaining the status of its empire.
The French and Indian War was the North American part of a much larger war raging in the mid-Eighteenth Century called the Seven Years War which ended shortly after the accession of King George III.
The Empires of Britain and France were struggling for control of multiple areas around the world, including North America.
In North America, that struggle raged for 5 years in actions ranging from isolated skirmishes to full scale invasions.
This put a heavy monetary strain on Great Britain which forced parliament to take measures to raise revenue to pay for troops deployed throughout its empire.
The British Parliament was not trying to harm its colonial subjects when it began passing the various Acts that led to the American Revolution.
Parliament simply did not understand the colonists' anger over its Acts.
Up until the 'Intolerable Acts' I believe that Parliament thought they were doing what was in the best interest of the colonies but felt that the colonist should bear the cost of their protection.
However, Parliament viewed colonists as peasants and not equals.
In an effort to pacify discontented colonist, Parliament would repeal Acts only to replace them with similar legislation.
For example the repeal of the Stamp Act did not mean that Great Britain was surrendering any control over its colonies.
The Declaratory Act, passed by Parliament on the same day the Stamp Act was repealed, stated that Parliament could make laws binding the American colonies in all cases whatsoever.
Colonist became less interested in reconciliation as Britain strived to maintain control.
Britain was not socially prepared to provide Parliamentary seats to colonial subjects, forgo taxes needed to support the empire, nor recognize the colonies as independent states.
All of which contributed to open rebellion.
Counterargument for Reconciliation There are steps that Britain could have taken to avert open rebellion once threatened by an American alliance with European nations.
The British government admits members of each colony into Parliament as voting observers, thus giving taxation with proper representation and diffusing a portion of the crisis.
The Governors would still be appointed by the Crown, but would be approved by parliament thus restoring a sense of self-rule to the colonies.
The second step would be to reinstate the colonies to the position which they held in relation to the imperial government by repealing all enactments in reference to the thirteen North American Colonies.
The above steps may have been successful if enacted early since many American colonist were not torn between war and reconciliation.
They simply did not want things to return to the way they were.
This is evident in the statement drafted by the moderate committee commissioned by congress to reply to the king's charge that the colonies intended to separate from Britain.
James Wilson wrote the committee report, which stated "the colonist wished to remain British subjects but were determined to continue as free men" (Middlekauff, pg.
322), a report that never made it through congress.
The fundamental views of the radicals in congress in contrast to all-or-nothing perspective of King George III and British Parliament were two conflicting perspectives that would have prevented this from being a successful endeavor; King George III made it perfectly clear where he stood with regards to the colonist in his writings to Lord Frederick North, "the colonies must either submit or triumph.
" (Middlkauff, pg 260) This implies that he expects open rebellion if the colonies do not concede.
He goes on to say that "by coolness and an unremitted pursuit of the measures that have been adopted I trust they will come to submit.
"This statement alone sums up the British lack of understanding of the colonial anger with Parliament's legislation.
Parliament would never repeal all the enactments since the accession of King George III.
To do so would be to admit errors on more than a dozen occasions over the span of ten years.
To complicate matters, in February 1776, the radical group in congress who believed in American independence rather than reconciliation "agreed upon a schedule of actions which they believed gave promise of a successful war for independence.
" (Middlekauff, pg 321)By May 1776 the radicals dominated a congress that believed that there was nothing left to do but move toward independence.
The British government could have averted war but the steps required to do so would have required King George and Parliament to take innovative initiatives that the British empire as a whole was incapable of doing.
It would have required a restructuring of the government as well as the social class.
It wasn't until after the King's bouts with madness and his poor handling of the American Revolution that Britain understood the importance of the Prime Minister.
British Use of Sea Power England was confident about its military authority and power after the seven years war.
However, in the case of the American Revolution, Britain had to fight an offensive war over 3,000 miles away, defeat the colonies decisively as well as win the hearts and minds of the populace in order to stamp out the rebellion.
The colonists only had to get a draw or last long enough to wear the British down which could be made possible with the intercession of European nations.
British had the numerical advantage, were better equipped, and better trained but employed inflexible tactics.
America's vast, far-away territory was in effect an unknown to the British.
Mahan was very critical of the British use of their Navy throughout the American Revolution.
His concept of large fleets fighting great sea battles and overwhelming the enemy was not employed by the British.
Providing for food and forage, the British Army had to rely primarily on sea lines of supply.
Transports were in short supply, the hardships of the 2- to 4-month voyage terrible, as well as the loss of men and supplies to natural causes.
Though the Americans could muster no navy capable of contesting British control of the seas, their privateers and the ships of their infant navy posed a constant threat to unprotected troop and supply transports.
British commanders repeatedly had to delay their operations, awaiting the arrival of men and supplies from England.
A Mahanian perspective of the American Revolution fails in "ascertaining the exact relation of Naval Strategy to the whole.
" (Corbett, pg.
307) The British used more of a Corbettian theory of sea power; project power ashore in supporting and sustaining armies ashore.
As long as they controlled the seas, the British could land and establish bases at nearly any point along the American coast line.
The many navigable rivers dotting the coast also provided water avenues of invasion well into the interior.
But to crush the revolt the British Army had to cut loose from coastal bases and rivers.
When it did so its logistical problems multiplied and its lines of communications became vulnerable to constant harassment.
As stated earlier the Seven Years War created a monetary drain on Britain.
This made it difficult to fight a distant war and maintain a large fleet.
During the outset of the revolution, Britain was either incapable or unwilling to employ a Mahanian theory of war.
The Corbettian approach addressed the logistical challenge of troop transport and support in a far-away territory as well as controlling key points such as Boston, New York, and the Chesapeake.
The Corbettian theory was the most practical approach until France signed a treaty of alliance with the United States in 1778 and Spain followed by declaring war on Great Britain in 1779.
Though Spain had no direct impact on the war, the indirect impact was that it forced Britain to reassess the allocation of forces.
Immediately following French intercession the British should have shifted focus to a Mahanian theory in order to interrupt European support.
The British failed to find the ideal balance between definitive sea battles and projecting power ashore.
Conclusion Just prior to the revolution, many Americans considered themselves British citizens, in every way equal to their Mother Land counterparts.
However, Parliament began to see the colonist not as a territory populated by British citizens but rather peasant farmers occupying British territory.
It is possible that the union which held the American colonies to Great Britain might have remained unbroken for an indefinite period, but for the unwise policy that brought about the resistance of the colonist.
I tend to believe thatAmerica was the child that had come of age, and that nothing could have prevented a political separation and that a separation sooner or later was inevitable.
There was no plot, nor conspiracy in America looking to independence; but there were forces at work for many years that must eventually dissolve the political bond between the two peoples.
Though America was the child of England, it was a child of the England of 1600 and not 1760.
There could have been a political solution, but Britain would have had to think so much more innovatively than they were capable of thinking at that time.
The English had a very difficult task, and maybe an impossible one, to put down a rebellion of such varying political dimensions.
The British were not prepared to deal with the colonies as equals which eventually spelled disaster.
The British had to fight the war with one eye on their ancient enemies in Europe.
France, thirsting for revenge for defeat in the Seven Years' War, could almost certainly carry Spain along in any war with England.
If for no other purpose than to weaken British power, France and Spain could provide badly needed money and supplies to sustain the American effort and force the British to divert their forces from the American conflict.
The combined Franco-Spanish fleet matched the British Fleet and quite possibly neutralized the essential control of the seas needed by the British to carry on the American war.
References Corbett, J.
S.
(1988).
Some Principles of Maritime Strategy.
The Naval Institute Press.
Mahan, A.
T.
(1987).
The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660 - 1783.
Dover Publications, Inc.
Middlekauff, R.
(1982).
The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution 1763 - 1789.
Volume II.
Oxford University Press.