Summary of the Executive Session on Emergency Preparedness
Summary of the Executive Session on Emergency Preparedness
Bethesda, Maryland, November 9, 2001
Responsibility for responding to homeland terrorist attacks and other emergencies begins at the local level and is grounded in collaboration between the private and public sectors. The federal government is ready, at a state's bidding, to assist communities quickly and in powerful ways -- supplying pharmaceuticals, trained personnel, equipment, and other resources. Effective response also requires the cooperation of individual health care professionals at the local level. Among those professionals whose participation is vital are pharmacists, who possess science-based knowledge and clinical acumen and are also widely accessible. The September 11th attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., and the subsequent bioterrorist threat posed by anthrax challenged our nation's medical disasterresponse system in unparalleled ways. Although the system rose to the occasion, there is ample room for improvement.
These are among the key points that emerged from an executive session on emergency preparedness and the pharmaceutical supply chain that was convened by the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) in Bethesda, Maryland, on November 9, 2001. The session brought together more than 35 representatives from federal public health and preparedness offices, pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesalers, group purchasing organizations, academic health-science centers, community hospitals, and health organizations. The objectives of the session were to
This document summarizes the discussions that took place at the executive session. It gives an overview of the federal emergency response system, summarizes participants' remarks concerning the strengths and vulnerabilities of the nation's medical emergency-response system, and offers recommendations for improving this system. The opinions expressed at the meeting were candid and forthright. Given the diversity of the participants' backgrounds, a consensus on all issues was not expected. Nonetheless, as discussions proceeded, a shared resolve to work collaboratively and in new ways to meet the challenges posed by the threat of homeland terrorism was strikingly clear.
Bethesda, Maryland, November 9, 2001
Responsibility for responding to homeland terrorist attacks and other emergencies begins at the local level and is grounded in collaboration between the private and public sectors. The federal government is ready, at a state's bidding, to assist communities quickly and in powerful ways -- supplying pharmaceuticals, trained personnel, equipment, and other resources. Effective response also requires the cooperation of individual health care professionals at the local level. Among those professionals whose participation is vital are pharmacists, who possess science-based knowledge and clinical acumen and are also widely accessible. The September 11th attacks in New York City and Washington, D.C., and the subsequent bioterrorist threat posed by anthrax challenged our nation's medical disasterresponse system in unparalleled ways. Although the system rose to the occasion, there is ample room for improvement.
These are among the key points that emerged from an executive session on emergency preparedness and the pharmaceutical supply chain that was convened by the American Society of Health-System Pharmacists (ASHP) in Bethesda, Maryland, on November 9, 2001. The session brought together more than 35 representatives from federal public health and preparedness offices, pharmaceutical manufacturers, wholesalers, group purchasing organizations, academic health-science centers, community hospitals, and health organizations. The objectives of the session were to
Conduct an open, honest, noncompetitive review of the readiness of the pharmaceutical supply chain (and related decision-support and drug information mechanisms) related to projected demands on the system in the face of homeland terrorism, while considering all aspects of the supply chain, from procuring raw materials for use in manufacturing to the delivery of finished products and information to patients;
Identify significant vulnerabilities in the pharmaceutical supply chain and steps that should be considered to remedy those vulnerabilities;
Identify means to communicate the session's deliberations -- particularly any vulnerabilities that are noted -- to appropriate public and private offices.
This document summarizes the discussions that took place at the executive session. It gives an overview of the federal emergency response system, summarizes participants' remarks concerning the strengths and vulnerabilities of the nation's medical emergency-response system, and offers recommendations for improving this system. The opinions expressed at the meeting were candid and forthright. Given the diversity of the participants' backgrounds, a consensus on all issues was not expected. Nonetheless, as discussions proceeded, a shared resolve to work collaboratively and in new ways to meet the challenges posed by the threat of homeland terrorism was strikingly clear.
